We study trade agreements where there is uncertainty about future political-economy value of protection in each country. We assume that the prevailing state of the world is private information of the importing country but it may be veri…ed publicly at a monitoring cost. The optimal trade agreement will be incomplete to save on the cost of implementation of the agreement. We interpret the GATT/WTO agreement as a cap-and-escape arrangement under which governments can increase their tari¤s above a pre-determined cap only if they produce evidence that certain states of the world have prevailed. We provide comparative statics results to show how a country's market power a¤ects the use of the two forms of ‡exibility: the ability to unilaterally change tari¤s when tari¤s are below the binding and the access to an escape clause. In particular, …nd that tari¤ bindings are lower for countries whose preferences are less convergent with those of the world, in the sense that their protectionist bias increases as their private valuation of protection increases. We also show that contingent protection and tari¤ overhang are substitute and they may not coexist when preferences are su¢ ciently convergent.
Introduction
Some form of escape clause has been a long-standing feature of international trade agree- In order for a country to exercise its right under the escape clause, it must conduct an investigation that establishes that there has been an increase in the level of imports and that this increase has caused "serious injury" to the domestic industry. These safeguard actions are an example of contingent protection, which allows for tari¤ concessions to be withdrawn if an investigation establishes that certain conditions have been met. Antidumping duties, which allow for the imposition of tari¤s in the event that imports are being sold at "less than fair value" and are resulting in injury to the domestic industry, represent another example of contingent protection in the WTO. 2 Contingent protection is not the only form of ‡exibility that is included in multilateral trade agreements. The fact that countries negotiate bindings, which are maximum tari¤ rates that can be applied on imports in a particular product classi…cation, means that countries can raise tari¤s unilaterally if they are below the binding. The di¤erence between the bound tari¤ and the applied tari¤ rate, referred to as "tari¤ overhang," provides a measure of the amount by which a country can raise its tari¤ without violating its WTO commitments. Table 1 illustrates the amount of tari¤ overhang that exists for 66 WTO members that account for 76% of world imports in 2007. Tari¤ overhang exists in sixty percent of the tari¤ lines that are bound, and this overhang averages more than 20 percentage points. If unbound tari¤ lines are included, more than 30% of trade takes place in tari¤ lines where there is tari¤ overhang.
The presence of these forms of ‡exibility seem to undermine one of the basic objectives of a trade agreement, which is to commit countries to reducing tari¤ rates. Since increases in tari¤ rates have a negative e¤ect on trading partners, trade agreements can be welfare 1 Sykes (2006) provides a good discussion of the history of the safeguard mechanisms. 2 Under the Safeguards agreement to the WTO, a country imposing safeguards is not required to compensate exporting countries for three years following the imposition of safeguards if there has been an absolute increase in imports. However, compensation must be negotiated if there increase in imports is only relative. The imposition of antidumping duties does not require compensation of a¤ected countries. Both forms of contingent are subject to dispute settlement if the rules are not followed in imposing protection. improving for all trading countries by reducing the international externalities through mutual tari¤ reductions. Contingent protection, on the other hand, will be internationally ine¢ cient because they will allow countries to continue to pursue protectionist policies.
Thus, many economists have advocated eliminatin An alternative interpretation of contingent protection and other forms of ‡exibility, and one that argues for their inclusion in trade agreements, is that they provide a safety valve that allows governments to deal with protectionist pressure. Politically motivated governments are reluctant to make commitments to bind tari¤s at low levels because they are concerned about future events that may lead to a demand for a protectionism, and therefore want to have the ‡exibility to increase tari¤s in those cases. In this view, the escape clause provides a safety valve for dealing with such protectionist pressure, and is the price that must be paid for countries to engage in signi…cant trade liberalization. 3 The purpose of this paper is to develop a model of politically motivated governments that allows for the simultaneous use of both tari¤ overhang and escape clauses as part of a trade agreement. We work within a simple political-economy trade model in which governments are uncertain about their future preferences over trade policy, so that the country's optimal tari¤ varies with the magnitude of a political shock. We adopt an incomplete contracting approach in which the magnitude of the political shock, and hence the importer's preferred tari¤, is the private information of the country. However, the importing country can make the value of its private information known to the rest of the world by incurring a monitoring cost.
Using this framework, we examine the optimal "cap-and-escape" agreement which has 3 Another type of ‡exibility may be provided through a remedy system in which a party is allowed to breach the contract if it provides appropriate compensations to the a¤ected parties. For a discussion of breach remedies in trade agreements see Posner and Sykes (2011), Beshkar (2010a) , and the papers cited in the next footnote.
features similar to that of the WTO trade agreement. The cap part of the agreement speci…es a tari¤ binding that allows the country to unilaterally choose any tari¤ less than or equal to the binding. The escape portion of the agreement allows the country to exceed the binding if the magnitude of the political shock is veri…ed to exceeds a threshold level.
The magnitude of the shock is veri…ed through a costly state veri…cation process. 4 The threshold level of the shock at which the importer can escape its bound tari¤, as well as the magnitude of the tari¤ that can be imposed when the value of the shock is revealed, are speci…ed as part of the trade agreement. The monitoring that takes place when the importer escapes the tari¤ binding can be interpreted as the investigative processes required to approve and implement contingent protection under the GATT/WTO agreements. This model yields the result that the escape clause allows for a reduction in tari¤ bindings in an optimal trade agreement, and also allows predictions about the relative importance of tari¤ overhang and the use of escape clause mechanisms.
Our analysis is related to several strands of recent work that uses an incomplete contracts approach to modeling trade agreements. Bagwell and Staiger (2005) have shown that the use of a weak tari¤ binding, which allows a country to choose its tari¤ at or below the binding, can yield a higher expected welfare than can be obtained by an in ‡exible tari¤ rate. Subsequently, Amador and Bagwell (2011) derived conditions under which the use of a tari¤ binding will be the optimal incentive compatible agreement. 5 Our work extends their analysis by in two ways. First, we use a model with asymmetric countries, which allows us to derive testable implications about the relationship between country characteristics and the optimal amount of tari¤ overhang. This is of interest because there is substantial variation across countries in the amount of overhang in tari¤ lines. 6 Second, the existing work on tari¤ bindings does not allow for the potential interactions between tari¤ bindings and contingent protection. Nevertheless, contingent protection measures 4 Other models, including Beshkar (2010b ) Maggi and Staiger (2011 ), and Park (2011 , examine state veri…cation processes that generate only an imperfect, albeit informative, signal of the state of the world. However, these models do not imply a role for tari¤ overhangs in trade agreements. 5 The models we consider are closely related to the literature on optimal delegation (e.g., Holmstrom 1984 , Melumad and Shibano 1991 , and Alonso and Matouschek 2008 , which has shown that it may be optimal for a principal to require a privately-informed agent to choose from a restricted set of actions when contingent transfers are not possible. 6 Almost 2/3 of the tari¤ lines of 69 WTO members are below their bound rates. The average level of tari¤ binding overhang, which is the di¤erence between the bound rate and the applied rate, is 25 percentage points or more than a quarter of the bound rates. However, there is no overhang in more than 90% of tari¤ lines for the US, European Union, China, and Japan. Thus, the usage of tari¤ overhang as a ‡exibility mechanism varies widely across countries. along with weak bindings are two important components of ‡exibility mechanisms in the WTO agreement. 7 Our work is the …rst to allow for the use of both bindings and escape clauses as part of optimal agreements, and to relate the usage of the respective types of ‡exibility to country characteristics.
Our approach is also related to works that examine the e¤ect of transactions costs on the optimal design of contracts. Shavell (2006) and Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2010) have shown that when writing a contract is costly, it is optimal to craft an incomplete contract in order to save on the ex ante contracting e¤orts. Our analysis di¤ers in that we emphasize the ex post costs of implementing the contract, which includes the costs of verifying the contingencies that are mentioned in the contract. We …nd that, due to the costs of implementing a contingent contract, it is optimal to write an incomplete contract that gives discretion to the parties in some contingencies.
Our approach, therefore, provides a distinct and novel rationale for writing an incomplete contract (such as tari¤ bindings) on the basis of the cost of implementing, rather than writing, the agreement. Implementing a complete agreement, which maps each possible contingency to a set of actions to be taken by the signatories, requires the parties to …nd a mutual agreement on the nature of the prevailing contingency in each period over the lifetime of the agreement. This requires establishing appropriate procedures for investigation of the contingencies in each member country as well as a dispute settlement process to handle potential disputes over the result of these investigations. Implementation of these procedures are potentially very costly as they involve hiring arbitrators, lawyers, and government representatives. 8 To the best of our knowledge, the previous literature has not explored the impact of the implementation costs on the optimal design of a trade agreement.
The model we consider is closely related to the literature on optimal delegation (e.g., Holmstrom 1984 , Melumad and Shibano 1991 , and Alonso and Matouschek 2008 , which has shown that it may be optimal for a principal to require a privately-informed agent to choose from a restricted set of actions when contingent transfers are not possible. Our 7 Between 1995 and 2010, a total of 216 safeguard actions and more than 2400 antidumping measures have been noti…ed to the WTO. The importance of contingent protection measures as an element of trade agreements was highlighted in the Doha round of WTO negotiations in which most developing countries demanded the inclusion of a safeguard clause in the agreement as a condition to accept trade liberalization in agricultural sectors. 8 Note that in contrast to implementation costs, the cost of composing a contract is a one-time expense. The fact that the cost of state veri…cation is a recurring cost over the lifetime of the agreement, multiplies the importance of designing a contract that saves on implementation costs. analysis extends the approach in this literature by allowing for the possibility of costly state veri…cation. Our approach to monitoring is similar to that in the seminal work of Townsend (1979) , where an agent's private information can be observed by the uninformed party through a costly monitoring. The optimal contracts in this literature typically involve two regions: a monitoring region in which the true type is revealed and the e¢ cient action for that type is taken, and a non-monitoring region in which agents pool and all take the same action. A novel result of our cap-and-escape model is that optimality involves giving countries 'discretion' in choosing their policy in the non-monitoring region, such that di¤erent types may not pool in the equilibrium.
We begin by deriving the optimal tari¤ binding in the absence of contingent protection.
We show that the cost of allowing ‡exibility through tari¤ overhang is greater for countries with a larger degree of market power. In order to provide ‡exibility when the magnitude of the shock is private information, the binding must be larger than the country's optimal tari¤ when the shock is at its lowest level. Since this level is greater for countries with greater market power, countries with greater market power will have lower tari¤ bindings. We also introduce the concept of local convergence of preferences, which holds if the di¤erence between the importer's optimal tari¤ and the world's optimal tari¤ gets smaller as the political weight increases, and show that a country will be provided less ‡exibility if the degree of convergence increases.
We then characterize the optimal cap-and-escape agreement in which the agreement can use both tari¤ bindings and contingent protection as ‡exibility mechanisms. We show that agreements with tari¤ bindings create an incentive to include an escape clause, because both importing country and world welfare will be raised by increasing tari¤s for the highest realizations of the political shock. An escape clause in an optimal agreement will specify the …rst best tari¤ when monitoring occurs, although the threshold speci…ed in the agreement to allow escape will exceed the level that is preferred by the importing country. We also establish that contingent protection is a substitute for tari¤ overhang, because it will result in a reduction in the tari¤ binding in the optimal trade agreement. In particular, the use of contingent protection will result in the elimination of tari¤ overhang if the importing country's preferences converge monotonically to that of the world as the value of protection increases for the importing government. We use simulations to show that tari¤ overhang and monitoring may exist simultaneously in an optimal agreement if preferences are locally divergent. The simulations also indicate that monitoring will be most valuable for relatively large countries, for whom the use of tari¤ overhang to provide ‡exibility is very costly. Kucik and Reinhardt (2009) …nd that countries that have antidumping laws in place are more likely to join the WTO and have lower tari¤ bindings. Since countries that have antidumping laws in place would be expected to have lower costs of undertaking the investigations, their empirical evidence is consistent with our theoretical results on the substitutability between binding overhang and contingent protection as monitoring costs are reduced.
Section 2 presents the trade model and characterizes the …rst best trade agreement when there is full information about the value of the political shocks. Section 3 characterizes the optimal tari¤ bindings when there is private information about political shocks. Section 3.2 introduces the possibility of contingent protection in the form of a binding agreement with an escape clause, and examines the interactions between tari¤ bindings and contingent protection in an optimal agreement. Section 4 o¤ers some concluding remarks. Proofs are provided in the Appendix A.
The Basic Model
We examine a two-good, two-country trade model in which countries are asymmetric in size.
We assume that industries are perfectly competitive, and that governments choose tari¤ policy to maximize a weighted social welfare function that re ‡ects the political in ‡uence of producers in the import-competing sector. In this setting, the motivation for forming a trade agreement is to resolve the Prisoner's dilemma created by the terms of trade externality from tari¤s as in Bagwell and Staiger (1999) . The asymmetry in country size is introduced in a manner similar to that in Bond and Park (2002) .
The home country demand for good i is given by d i = (1 p i ) for i = 1; 2, where p i is the price of good i and 2 (0; 1) is the relative size of the home country. Foreign country demands are d i = (1 )(1 p i ). Home supply is x 1 = p 1 for good 1 and x 2 = p 2 for good 2, while foreign supplies are x 1 = (1 ) p 1 and x 2 = (1 )p 2 . We assume that > 1, so the autarky prices will satisfy p 1 = p 2 = 1=2 > p 1 = p 2 = 1=(1 + ). Parameters and can be interpreted, respectively, as the relative size of the home country, and the comparative advantage of the exporting country in its exportable sector. 9 9 Note that this model of comparative advantage can be derived from a general-equilibrium model with a third good that absorbs all income e¤ects. Let the home country consist of a measure of N identical households with each household having a utility function U = P i=1;2 di(1 :5di) + d0. Households have an endowment of labor that can be allocated to production of the three goods. Letting li denote the quantity of labor allocated to good i, the production functions are x0 = l0, x1 = (2l1) :5 and x2 = (2 l2) :5 . Similarly, In light of the separability and symmetry of markets, we can focus our analysis on the market for the home importable. The characterization of the market for the foreign's importable follows immediately. Letting t be the ad valorem tari¤ imposed by the home country on imports we have p = p (1 + t). The respective country excess demands are given by m = (1 2p i ), and m = (1 )(1 (1 + )p ), which yields market clearing prices with trade of
The relative size of the countries determines the magnitude of the terms of trade externality resulting from the home country tari¤, with dp =dt ! 0 as ! 0 and dp =dt ! 1 as ! 1. The prohibitive tari¤ will be t pro = 1 2 . We can use the inverse of the foreign elasticity of export supply,
to characterize the home country's market power in its import markets. Market power is positive for t < t pro ; and is increasing in the home country's relative size, ; and its degree of comparative disadvantage, . Note however that the there is an important di¤erence in the e¤ect of these two parameters on market power. The marginal e¤ect of country size on market power declines as t increases, because market power goes to 0 as the tari¤ approaches the prohibitive level and the prohibitive tari¤ is independent of market size. In contrast, the marginal e¤ect of increases in on market power increases as t rises because the prohibitive tari¤ is increasing in . This distinction in market power e¤ects will play an important role in the analysis below.
Non-Cooperative and Cooperative Tari¤s
We assume that the government's preference over tari¤s can be described by a 'political' welfare function, where the government puts a weight of 1+ on the welfare of producers in the import-competing sector and a weight of 1 on the welfare of all other agents. We assume the foreign country is assumed to have N households with the same preferences and production functions x 0 = l 0 , x 1 = (2 l 1 ) :5 , and x 2 = (2l 2 ) :5 : Choosing good 0 as numeraire and letting = N=(N + N ), this structure yields the demand and supply functions in the text if the supply of labor is su¢ ciently large that good 0 is always produced. that 0; and interpret as the political pressure that is exerted by the import-competing sector on the government. The political welfare function may be written as
where, consumer surplus is given by S(t) = (1 p(t)) 2 =2, producer surplus by (t) = p(t) 2 =2, and tari¤ revenue by tp m(t) = tp (1 2p).
Increases in t have a favorable e¤ect on political welfare by improving the terms of trade and transferring income to domestic producers of import-competing goods (when > 0). However, increases in t also reduce trade volume, which is welfare reducing when the domestic price exceeds the world price for importables. As a result of these trade-o¤s, home country welfare is strictly quasi-concave in t for t 2 [0; t pro ]: 10 The unique optimal tari¤ that maximizes V (t) is given by
As a result of the separability assumption, this tari¤ is a dominant strategy for the home country and will be the Nash equilibrium tari¤. We let max 2( 1)=(1 + ) < 2 denote the value of the political pressure, , at which the home country's optimal tari¤ eliminates trade, t N ( max ; ) = t pro . We will assume that 2 [ ; ], where 0 and max .
The following characteristics of the importer's optimal tari¤ function follow immediately from di¤erentiation of (4) and will be useful in the analysis below Lemma 1 For < max and 2 (0; 1);
The importer's optimal tari¤ is increasing in the magnitude of the political shock and the home country's market power, as re ‡ected in its size and degree of comparative disadvantage. Part (ii) highlights that the impact of relative to is increasing in the magnitude of the political shock. This results from the fact that the e¤ect of on market
power is increasing in t and the e¤ect of on market power is decreasing in t, as re ‡ected in (2).
For the foreign country, welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and …rm pro…ts,
Foreign welfare is decreasing and convex in t: An increase in the home tari¤ worsens the terms of trade for the foreign country, which reduces foreign welfare. The convexity of foreign welfare arises because the adverse terms of trade e¤ect is proportional to the volume of foreign exports, and the volume of exports declines with increases in t.
World welfare in the home country importable sector is the sum of home and foreign country welfare, W (t; ) = V (t; ) + V (t). World welfare will be quasiconcave in t for 2 [0; max ], and achieves a maximum at 11
The e¢ cient tari¤ will be positive for 0 < max because world welfare incorporates the importing country's preference to protect its producers. At = max , the weight on producer interests is su¢ ciently high that the e¢ cient tari¤ eliminates trade.
We assume that the home country's political parameter has a distribution f ( ) on .
Similarly, there is a distribution of foreign political shocks f ( ) and Nash equilibrium tari¤s for the foreign country in the market for good 2, t N ( ), derived as above for the home country. In the absence of a trade agreement, countries will impose state contingent tari¤s ft N ( ); t N ( )g. Since countries ignore the adverse terms of trade e¤ect on the foreign country in setting their tari¤s, gains from reciprocal trade liberalization will exist in each state of the world.
We will assume that countries can make lump sum transfers in the negotiations for the formation of a trade agreement. Countries will then negotiate a trade agreement whose tari¤ schedule maximizes expected world welfare, with transfers determining the split of the gains from the agreement between countries. 12 The home country tari¤ schedule that 1 1 Derivative of the world welfare with respect to tari¤ is Wt = (1+ )(1 )( t(2 )) ( (1 )+ (1+2t)+1) 3 . As is clear from this expression, world welfare is increasing for t < 2 and decreasing for t > 2 . Therefore, W is quasiconcave and t E ( ) is the jointly optimal tari¤. 1 2 As discussed by Syropoulos (2002) , the home country will prefer the Nash equilbirium to free trade for maximizes world welfare will be the solution to
The solution to this problem will call for setting the state contingent e¢ cient tari¤s from (6) for the home country. E¢ cient foreign tari¤s on imports of good 2 are derived in a similar fashion. This …rst-best outcome, however, cannot be implemented under asymmetric information. We will analyze tari¤ caps and cap-and-escape arrangements as incentivecompatible mechanisms under asymmetric information in Sections 3 and 3.2.
Convergence of Preferences
The di¤erence between the Nash tari¤ and the e¢ cient tari¤, which we denote by ( ) t N ( ) t E ( ); is positive for 2 [0; max ) and 2 (0; 1) because the home country fails to internalize the terms of trade externality it imposes on the foreign country. Since t E ( ) is independent of the market power parameters, ( ) is increasing in and by Lemma 1 (ii). The Nash and e¢ cient tari¤s are only equal in the absence of market-power e¤ects, which occurs when the country is in…nitesimally small
. Although the market-power e¤ect must go to zero as trade is eliminated, this does not guarantee that the preferences of the importing country and the world will become more aligned as the political shock increases in value on . This point is illustrated in Figure 1 , which shows the relationship between t N ( ) and t E ( ) for two di¤erent levels of when = [0; 2=3] and = 0:3. When = 2, 0 ( ) < 0 for all 2 , a property that we will refer to as 'globally convergent' preferences. 13 In contrast, 0 ( ) > 0 for all 2 when = 10. 14 The possibility that 0 ( ) > 0 for some values of is related to the observation in Lemma 1 (ii) that the impact of on market power increases as the applied tari¤ rises.
Converging preferences imply that the protectionist bias of the importer's tari¤ policy decreases as the political shock increases in value. This property will play an important role in determining the types of ‡exibility that arise in the optimal cap-and-escape agreement, su¢ ciently large. In that case, transfers will be necessary to induce participation by the large country. 1 3 In particular, for the case where = 2, the market power e¤ect goes to zero as ! max 2( 1)=(1 + ) = 2=3:
1 4 Since max = 18=11 for = 10, the Nash and e¢ cient tari¤s do not approach the prohibitive level on = [0; 2=3] in Figure 1 . so it will be useful to provide some conditions under which preferences converge. We say that the preferences of the importer and the world are 'locally convergent' at if 0 ( ) < 0.
(i) The preferences of the importer and the world are locally convergent at (i.e., 0 ( ) < 0) i¤ <~ ( ). For <~ (0) = 1 + 2 p 1 + ; preferences are globally convergent.
Part (i) of this Lemma shows that for the preferences to be convergent, the comparative advantage parameter, , must be su¢ ciently small. Notably, if > 1 + 2 p 1 + , there will exist a range of such that the home country's optimal tari¤ will increase more rapidly than the e¢ cient tari¤ as the political shock increases. For the parameter values used in Figure 1 , there will be global divergence on [0; 2=3] for >~ (2=3) = 5:42 and global convergence for < 3:28 For 2 (3:28; 5:42), the tari¤ schedules will be locally divergent for 2 [0;~ 1 ( )) and locally convergent for 2 (~ 1 ( ); 2=3).
Part (ii) of Lemma 2 shows that an increase in and a corresponding reduction in that keeps the average di¤erence between importer and world preferences constant for > 0 will "rotate"the ( ) schedule around some point on the interval 2 [ 0 ; ), making the preferences of the importer less convergent with that of the world as a whole on that interval. This result is due to the observation in Lemma 1(iii) that the market power e¤ect of rises relative to that of as increases.
Optimal Cap and Escape Agreements
We now turn to the analysis of trade agreements in settings where the magnitude of the political pressure is the private information of the importing country. We will assume that the distribution of the political shock in each country is common knowledge, but the realization is observed only by the importing country. We model the optimal trade agreement as the solution to a principal/agent problem in which an uninformed principal (the WTO) is specifying the actions (tari¤ levels) to be taken by an informed agent (the importing country).
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. We …rst characterize the optimal tari¤ binding, t B ; in an agreement that allows the importer to choose any tari¤ rate t t B . The comparative statics results we obtain are useful for understanding how country characteristics determine the amount of ‡exibility that is provided to a country in setting its tari¤, where a higher tari¤ binding provides greater ‡exibility. We also apply results from Alonso and Matouschek 2008 and Amador and Bagwell (2011) to show that the tari¤ binding is the optimal form of trade agreement in this setting. The second step is to introduce the possibility of escape, which allows the country to exceed its tari¤ binding if it incurs a monitoring cost, c. In this case the e¢ cient trade agreement speci…es a monitoring region (M v ) and a tari¤ schedule tari¤ t M ( ) that applies in the monitoring region, along with a tari¤ binding that applies when there is no monitoring. The cap and escape agreement allows two types of ‡exibility: unilateral changes in tari¤s below the bindings and the use of escape clauses when monitoring costs are incurred. This allows us to examine the extent to which the availability of monitoring substitutes for the use of tari¤ overhang as a means of providing ‡exibility in the trade agreement.
Optimal Bindings Without Monitoring
Under a tari¤ binding t B , the importing country can choose any tari¤ t t B without violating the agreement. The importer's welfare is increasing in t for all t < t N ( ), so the importer will choose an applied tari¤ of min[t N ( ); t B ] when the political shock is .
Since the optimal tari¤ is increasing in ; the importer will choose its optimal tari¤ for B (t B ) = maxf ; t N 1 (t B )g. The importer's choice of tari¤ under the binding can be represented by the state contingent tari¤ schedule
If t B > t N ( ), there will exist states of the world for which the tari¤ is strictly less than the binding. We refer to this as a tari¤ binding agreement with tari¤ overhang. If t B t N ( ), the importing country's tari¤ will be at the binding for all states of the world and there is no overhang. Note that a tari¤ binding is contained in the set of incentive compatible trade agreements since it satis…es V (t( ); ) V (t(r); ) 0 for all r; 2
In state the importer prefers its assigned tari¤ to that it would obtain by reporting a state r 6 = .
We assume that transfers between countries are available ex ante, so that the objective for the trade agreement is to maximize expected world welfare. The optimal tari¤ binding agreement is obtained by maximizing (7) subject to (8), which can be expressed as
where,
An analogous expression can be derived for the tari¤ binding for the foreign country.
Noting that W (t; ) = W (t; 0) + (t), the necessary condition for optimality can be expressed as
This expression will have two types of solutions: one in which the bracketed expression equals 0 and one where B (t B ) = : It can be shown that the latter solution must be a local minimum if < max , so we concentrate on the former. The …rst term in the bracketed expression is the deadweight loss per dollar of pro…t obtained by an increase in the tari¤ binding, and can be interpreted as the cost of raising the binding. Evaluating this terms using (3), we have W t (t B ; 0)= t (t B ) = 2t B =(1 + t B ), which is illustrated by the C(t) schedule in Figure 2 . The cost of raising the binding is increasing in t B because the marginal deadweight loss is increasing more rapidly than the marginal pro…t gain as the binding rises. 15 The second term in the bracketed expression is the expected political gain from raising the binding. The B(t; ; ) = E( j B ) locus in Figure 2 locus is the expected bene…t of raising the binding, which is the expected value of the political shock for values at which the tari¤ is at the binding. This locus will be horizontal at E( ) for t B < t N ( ), because the binding applies for all : For t B > t N ( ) B locus is upward sloping, 1 5 It might seem surprising that the cost of raising the binding is independent of country size. The impact of market power arises through its impact on dp dt ; which a¤ects both numerator and denominator of the expression by the same proportion. For general demand and supply expressions, C(t) = t 1+t , where @m @p y p . With our linear speci…caiton, = 2 for all t.
@t B > 0, because increase in t B reduce the fraction of states in which the tari¤ is at the binding. The necessary condition for an optimum will be satis…ed at the intersection of these loci.
In order to simplify the analysis and obtain a closed form solution for the optimal binding, we will assume that the political pressure parameter has a power-function distribution given by namely,
This formulation yields a uniform distribution for = 1, with f 0 ( ) > 0 for < 1 and f 0 ( ) < 0 for > 1. Under this distribution function, the expected political gain from raising the binding is given by
Utilizing (13) we obtain the following characterization of the optimal binding (see Appendix for proof):
Proposition 1 Assume that < max 2 1 +1 and the political pressure parameter has a power-function distribution as given by (12). The optimal binding will have the following properties:
(i) If <~ (1+ ) max < 1 , the optimal binding will be t B = max 2 4 =(1+ ) , which is decreasing in and . The agreement will exhibit tari¤ overhang.
(ii) If
~ ; the optimal binding agreement will involve a tari¤ binding t B = E( ) 2 E( ) = + 2( +1) ( + ) with no overhang.
Proposition 1 can be illustrated using Figure 2 . An increase in market power (either through higher values of or ), will have a lower threshold value B and thus a lower bene…t from raising the binding. This occurs because a larger country tends to use the maximum tari¤ more liberally by applying it even when the political pressure is relatively low, which generates a smaller political gain on average. Therefore, an increase in market power will result in a rightward shift in the B locus as illustrated in Figure 2 . on the optimal binding for >~ . 16
For <~ , B(t N ( )) > C(t N ( )) so the optimal binding must involve overhang. The assumption that < max ensures that C(t pro ) > B(t pro ), so an interior solution with t B 2 (t N ( ); t pro ) will exist. In order for an interior solution to represent a maximum, the C(t) schedule must be steeper than the B(t) schedule at an intersection point, which requires 2
When expected value is given by (13), this condition simpli…es to < 1: Note that the de…nition of~ ensures that this condition will be satis…ed, so there will be a unique binding with tari¤ overhang for <~ . Since increases in market power shift the B(t) schedule rightward, the binding will be decreasing in and for <~ . 17 A country's market power a¤ects the amount of ‡exibility provided in an optimal agreement because it a¤ects the di¤erence between the importer's optimal tari¤ and the e¢ cient tari¤. However, the amount of ‡exibility will also depend on how the di¤erence between the optimal tari¤ and the e¢ cient tari¤ vary with the level of the political shock.
Consider a perturbation of the preferences (as in Lemma 2 (ii)) that raises and reduces to keep the expected Nash tari¤ constant in the region where the tari¤ is at the binding.
This change will reduce t N ( B ), which has the e¤ect of raising B at an interior solution and shifting the bene…t schedule upward in Figure 2 at an interior solution. This yields Proposition 2 An increase in and reduction in that keeps R B t N ( )f ( )d constant will raise the tari¤ binding in an optimal agreement. This result indicates that the level of the tari¤ binding depends not only on the home country's market power, but also on how convergent the importer's preferences are to those of the world as increases.
Optimal Agreements with Costly Monitoring
We now consider the possibility that by incurring a monitoring cost of c, the importing country is able to reveal the true value of to the rest of the world. We can then specify a trade agreement as consisting of two regions: a monitoring region (M v ) and a non-monitoring region (M C ). A country reporting a state in the non-monitoring region is assumed to be subject to a tari¤ binding, as in the previous section. If the importing country incurs the monitoring cost and a state 2 M is veri…ed, then it receives the tari¤ t M ( ) that is speci…ed as part of the agreement. If the importer incurs the monitoring cost and the state is revealed to be outside the monitoring region, then it is subject to the binding. The monitoring region corresponds to the escape clause of a trade agreement, and represents the conditions that must be met in order for the country to be able to violate the binding. The importer's announcement of a state in the monitoring region can be thought of as the initiation of an investigation and the incurring of the resource costs required to establish that the conditions required for violating the binding are met. country with no market power, so that its tari¤ has no spillover e¤ects on the rest of the world and the nationally optimal tari¤ will correspond to the world optimum. The second is the case in which the expected value of the political shock is su¢ ciently high that political concerns outweigh the spillover from the terms of trade. If > max , then t B = t pro can be a local maximum.
Once the true state is revealed, the importer can impose the tari¤ t M ( ). In order for a tari¤ t M ( ) in the monitoring region to be incentive compatible, the importing country must prefer the payo¤ it receives from undergoing monitoring to any tari¤ that it could choose in the non-monitoring region, namely V (t( ); ) V (t(r); ) c for all 2 M; r 2 M C :
For 2 M C , there is no incentive to choose a report in the monitoring region because the assigned tari¤ will be the same as if no monitoring had occurred but the cost of monitoring will be incurred.
The potential for such an agreement to improve on the agreement with a tari¤ binding alone can be seen from the necessary condition for the optimal binding, (11), which shows that the binding will exceed the e¢ cient tari¤ at B and will be less than the e¢ cient tari¤ in the neighborhood of . For values of su¢ ciently high, an increase in the applied tari¤ would bene…t both the importing country and the world as a whole. O¤ering a high tari¤ in the event that a high value of the political shock is veri…ed has the potential to be both welfare improving and incentive compatible if c is not too large. World welfare can also be improved if tari¤s are reduced for low realizations of , since the e¢ cient tari¤ is below that speci…ed under the binding. However, monitoring would not be incentive compatible in this case because the importer prefers the tari¤ o¤ered under the binding to the e¢ cient tari¤.
In light of these observations, we will examine monitoring that takes the form of "capand-escape" agreements. A cap-and-escape agreement is one in which the monitoring region takes the form of an interval of the highest realizations of , M = [ M ; ]. These agreements are also of interest because they have features of the safeguards agreement in the WTO, which allows countries to raise their tari¤s above the binding in extraordinary circumstances.
Optimal Cap-and-Escape Agreements
A cap-and-escape agreement can be characterized by a tari¤ binding, t B , a threshold value, M , for the monitoring region, M = [ M ; ], and a tari¤ schedule for the monitoring region, t M ( ). We begin our analysis by establishing the following Lemma, which characterizes the optimal escape rule f M ; t M ( )g given t B :
Lemma 3 Suppose that for a given t B , there exists a^ < such that W (t E (^ );^ ) c = W (t B ;^ ): Then given t B ; the optimal escape rule is given by
, the only incentive compatible tari¤ schedule is given by t N ( ) and, hence, monitoring in this region is not optimal. For > t N 1 (t B ), monitoring will
is decreasing in t, any agreement with t > t B that raises world welfare is also incentive compatible. Therefore, the monitoring region should consist of all such that world welfare can be raised by monitoring. World welfare cannot be improved by monitoring for 2 [t E 1 (t B );^ ]; because Figure 3 illustrates the form of the tari¤ schedule under a cap and escape agreement as given by Lemma 3. For < M , the importer's tari¤ is determined by the tari¤ binding. For M , the importer incurs the cost of monitoring and receives the e¢ cient tari¤, with the boundary of the monitoring region chosen to make world welfare equal under monitoring and the binding. Lemma 3 shows that monitoring occurs less frequently than would be desired by the importing country, because M exceeds the value of at which the importing country is indi¤erent between t B and incurring the monitoring costs to obtain the e¢ cient tari¤. 18 This is because the importing country's tari¤ imposes negative externalities on the rest of the world and, hence, the threshold level of for monitoring to raise world welfare is above the threshold for the importer to gain from monitoring. In particular we must have B < t E 1 (t B ) < M . As a result, an optimal cap and escape agreement will specify an e¢ cient tari¤ for the entire monitoring region because the incentive constraint on monitoring is not binding. Note that this result would continue to hold if part of the monitoring costs were paid by the rest of the world, since this would only have the e¤ect of further relaxing the importer's reporting constraint.
The boundary of the monitoring region is the solution to
Figure 3: Cap and Escape Tari¤ Schedule
Totally di¤erentiating this condition and rearranging yields
and
for t B < t pro . Therefore, a higher binding reduces the bene…t of monitoring and thus reduces the range of political parameters over which monitoring is optimal. Similarly, higher costs of monitoring will reduce the range of realizations for which monitoring is chosen.
Using (16), we can express the problem for designing the optimal cap-and-escape agreement as
The necessary condition for optimal choice of binding will be
For cases in which monitoring takes place with c > 0, we have F ( M (t B )) > F ( B (t B )) and
the necessary condition can only be satis…ed if the bracketed expression equals 0. As in the case without monitoring, the bracketed expression requires that the deadweight loss per unit of pro…t generated by an increase in the binding equal the expected political bene…t over the region of shocks where the tari¤ is at the binding.
The expected bene…t of raising the binding when
will be less than the expected bene…t when there is no monitoring, is non-decreasing in c, it follows that @E[W ] @t B < 0 for all values of t exceeding the optimal binding from Proposition 1 when monitoring is allowed. This observation, combined with the fact that that expected payo¤ is continuous in t on [0; t pro ], yields the following result.
Proposition 3 If < max and the distribution of political shocks is given by (12), there will exist a tari¤ binding t B < t pro that maximizes expected world welfare with monitoring. If M (t B ; c) < , t B is less than the binding that maximizes world welfare without monitoring.
For countries su¢ ciently large that ~ , there was no ‡exibility in the agreement without monitoring. The introduction of monitoring thus allows ‡exibility for countries with a su¢ ciently large degree of market power, and also results in a lowering of the binding. For countries with a lower degree of market power, <~ , the agreement without monitoring included tari¤ overhang. For these countries, Proposition 3 shows that the introduction of monitoring substitutes for overhang as a source of ‡exibility because it must reduce the average amount of tari¤ overhang in the optimal agreement.
For countries that had overhang without monitoring, the introduction of monitoring may result in an optimal contract that involves both monitoring and overhang. However, it could also result in a complete switch to an agreement with no overhang and monitoring.
This possibility is illustrated in Figure 4 , which illustrates how reductions in monitoring costs a¤ect the expected bene…t locus, B(t; c): Letting c max = t(0), the B(t; c max ) locus is the expected bene…t of raising the binding when monitoring costs are su¢ ciently high that no monitoring takes place for any level of the binding..At c 1 < c max ; the bene…t of raising the binding is reduced for all levels of the binding at which monitoring takes place, t < t(c 1 ). Note that since monitoring is most attractive when the binding is low, the reductions in the expected bene…t are greatest at low levels of the tari¤ binding. With a low binding, it will be optimal to allow escape for a greater range of values of . For the B(t; c 1 ) locus illustrated in Figure 4 , the necessary condition is satis…ed at 3 values of the binding: the initial binding t B (c max ) at which there is no monitoring, a low binding with monitoring and no overhang, and an intermediate binding with both monitoring and overhang. Note however that the intermediate binding with both monitoring and overhang will not satisfy the second order conditions. Thus, the maximum in this case must be at a trade agreement in which only one form of ‡exibility is used. The B(t; c 0 ) locus shows a level of monitoring costs at which the bene…ts of monitoring have fallen su¢ ciently that there is only on binding satisfying the necessary conditions. The binding in this case is denoted t B (c 0 ), which yields an agreement with no overhang. The example in Figure 4 illustrates that the optimal agreement could switch from one with overhang and no monitoring to one with no overhang and monitoring once a critical threshold is reached. Note also that this switch will result in a signi…cant drop in the binding.
. How likely is it that we obtain an agreement with both monitoring and overhang? In order for an agreement to include both monitoring and overhang, there must be an intersec- (18), we obtain the requirement for an interior solution to be a maximum is that
An increase in t B raises both the upper and lower thresholds of the region where the tari¤ is at the binding. This contrasts while in the case without monitoring an increase in t B only raises the lower threshold. Both of these e¤ects increase the slope of the schedule of marginal bene…t of raising the binding, making the conditions for an interior maximum more stringent than in the case without monitoring.
In order to address the existence of interior optima with both binding and overhang, we focus on the case where has a uniform distribution, which yields E( j M > > B ) =
The following Lemma establishes that if Nash and e¢ cient tari¤s are convergent at M , or equivalently if <~ ( M ), the second order condition (??) is violated.
Lemma 4 Suppose that has a uniform distribution with < < max and the necessary condition is satis…ed with < B (t B ) < M (t B ) < . This solution will fail to satisfy the second-order condition if <~ ( M ).
Lower values of have two e¤ects that make it more di¢ cult to satisfy (??). One is that it makes the Nash tari¤ schedule less responsive to political shocks, which raises @ B @t B . A second is that it raises the tari¤ binding associated with an interior solution for given M ; which reduces the left hand side of the inequality in (??). The proof of Lemma 4 establishes that these two e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong that the a local maximum cannot
The following is an immediate implication of Lemma 4:
Proposition 4 If preferences are globally convergent (i.e., if <~ (0) 1 + 2 p 1 + ) then escape and overhang do not coexist under an optimal cap-and-escape agreement.
In other words, for a given country size, if the comparative advantage parameter is not too large, ‡exibility is provided either through overhang or an escape clause, but not both. The example illustrated in Figure ? ? satis…es the condition for global convergence of preferences, so the agreement changes from one with overhang and no monitoring to one with no overhang and monitoring as monitoring costs are reduced. The two forms of ‡exibility are su¢ ciently close substitutes that only one will be used in an agreement.
Note that this result is also consistent with Proposition 2, since it suggests that reducing convergence of preferences makes overhang less valuable as a ‡exibility mechanism.
Numerical Examples
Proposition 4 indicates that >~ ( M ) is necessary for there to be an interior solution that is a maximum. However, it does not guarantee that there exist a parameterization for which a trade agreement with both overhang and monitoring is a global maximum. In this section we provide a numerical example to show that both overhang and monitoring may be part of an e¢ cient agreement when >~ ( M ). This example also provides some insights on how the use of monitoring and overhang varies with country size and the level of monitoring costs.
We consider an example with having a uniform distribution on [0; 0:75]. Since~ ( ) is increasing in and , the preferences of the importing country will be locally divergent on Proposition 1 for the case where monitoring is not allowed, this parameterization yields an agreement with no overhang and a bound tari¤ of t B = 0:23 for ~ = 0:26. For <~ , the agreement without monitoring will involve overhang and will have a binding that is decreasing in and approaches a maximum of 0:6 as ! 0. Figure 5 shows the level of the tari¤ binding in the optimal cap-and-escape agreement for relatively small countries, 2 f0:1; 0:15; 0:2g; as the level of monitoring costs varies.
The horizontal segment in each schedule corresponds to an agreement in which there is a tari¤ binding with overhang but no monitoring takes place. In this region the monitoring costs are su¢ ciently high that the monitoring region is empty. The fact that the horizontal segment decreases in country size in the absence of monitoring re ‡ects the result of in Proposition 1.
The steeply increasing segments for each relationship in Figure 5 correspond to the values of monitoring costs for which the trade agreement uses both overhang and monitoring. The introduction of monitoring results in a sharp decline in the binding, as the use of monitoring is substituted for tari¤ overhang as a source of ‡exibility. This illustrates the strong degree of substitutability between monitoring and overhang, even in cases where is relatively high. Note also that the threshold level of monitoring costs at which monitoring is introduced into the optimal contract increases more than proportionally with the size of the country. The threshold monitoring cost for = :2 is approximately 8 times that for = 0:1. This suggests that overhang is relatively more useful as a means of introducing ‡exibility into a contract for countries that are small.
The slowly increasing segments in each locus in Figure 5 correspond to the region of monitoring costs where there is no overhang in the trade agreement. Reductions in monitoring costs in this region result in the use of more monitoring, but the e¤ect on the tari¤ binding is smaller than in the region where the agreement has tari¤ overhang in some states of the world. Note that for all country sizes illustrated in Figure 5 , a larger country size is associated with lower bindings both in agreements with and without monitoring.
Overall, these results indicate agreements with overhang and no monitoring at high levels of c, agreements with both monitoring and overhang at intermediate levels of c and no overhang at low levels of c. Figure 6 depicts the relationship between monitoring costs and bindings for larger country sizes, 2 f0:22; 0:27; 0:32g. For = 0:22 <~ , the pattern is similar to that in As monitoring costs fall, the optimal agreement moves directly from an agreement with no overhang and no monitoring to one with no overhang and monitoring as monitoring costs fall. For countries in this size range, market power is su¢ ciently large that it is never optimal to have overhang as part of the trade agreement. The threshold level of monitoring costs at which monitoring is introduced into the agreement is also increasing in country size for the examples illustrated in Figure 6 , although the change in the monitoring cost with respect to country size is smaller.
For < 1 + 2 p 1 + , there will be no interior solutions for any ( ; c) pairs. In this case there will be two di¤erent types of paths for trade agreements in response to reductions in monitoring costs. For <~ ; the optimal agreement will switch from one with overhang and no monitoring to one with monitoring and no overhang as monitoring costs fall below the threshold level. These countries are su¢ ciently small that tari¤ overhang is used to provide ‡exibility when monitoring is not used. However, due to the local convergence in preferences between the importer and the world for these parameter values, the introduction of monitoring will completely eliminate the use of tari¤ overhang in the agreement. This monitoring and overhang coexist. For < 1+2 p 1 + and >~ , there will be a threshold level of costs such that the agreement has no monitoring or overhang above the threshold and monitoring without overhang below. This outcome is similar to that illustrated in Figure 6 for = f0:27; 0:32g, because these countries are su¢ ciently large that overhang is not used as part of an optimal trade agreement.
One of the concerns expressed about the WTO mechanisms has been that small and developing countries face a disadvantage in participating in WTO contingent protection mechanisms due to the large …xed cost element involved in participation. This point has been made in the context of dispute settlement (e.g. Bown (2005) and Sha¤er (2003)).
Since one of the costs of contingent protection mechanisms is the possibility that a dispute is initiated as a result of the action, our results have the potential to provide some insight on this issue. Our simulations suggest that the threshold level of monitoring cost at which monitoring will be used is increasing in country size for small and medium-sized countries. 19 In particular, the threshold may increase more than proportionally with country size.
However, our analysis also shows that small countries have an advantage in the use of tari¤ overhang, which serves as an alternative ‡exibility mechanism to contingent protection measures.
Conclusions
Our analysis has shown how tari¤ bindings and contingent protection provide alternative means of introducing ‡exibility into trade agreements. Tari¤ overhang allows countries to make unilateral policy changes in response to political shocks, but has the disadvantage that the importing country will always choose a tari¤ that is higher than the …rst best tari¤. As a result, tari¤ overhang will be used most extensively for countries that have relatively little market power. In contrast, contingent protection allows the imposition of tari¤s that are e¢ cient from a world point of view. However, it has the disadvantage of requiring the use of resources to verify the state.
Our results indicates that allowing contingent protection will result in a substitution of monitoring for tari¤ overhang if monitoring costs are su¢ ciently low. In particular, we showed that agreements will never involve both the use of contingent protection and tari¤ overhang if the preferences of the importer and the world are everywhere locally convergent.
However, monitoring and overhang may coexist if preferences of the importer and the world are locally divergent. Our simulations also indicated that contingent has the lowest value for relatively small countries, since the use of tari¤ overhang will be a relatively more e¢ cient mechanism for providing ‡exibility when terms of trade externalities are small.
Our analysis has highlighted the role of both market power and the convergence of preferences as determining the relative importance of tari¤ overhang and escape clauses in providing ‡exibility. Our analysis is the …rst to emphasize the role of preference convergence, which refers to whether the protectionist bias of importing countries increases or decreases as the magnitude of political shocks increase. Models which rely on the terms of trade externalities as the source of externalities in trade agreements will necessarily result in the convergence of preferences if political shocks are su¢ ciently large that they result in the imposition of prohibitive tari¤s. However, our analysis shows that divergences of preferences can occur for smaller magnitudes of the political shocks and may play an important role in determining the value of tari¤ overhang. The role of preference divergence in other types of political economy models remains an area for future work.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Di¤erentiation of (4) yields @t N @ = 2(1 + )(1 + ) 2 > 0 @t N @ = 8 (1 + ) > 0 @t N @ = 2(1 + ) (2( 1) ( + 1) ) > 0 for < max where = (( + 1)(2 ) + 4 ) 2 : Part (iii) follows from @t N @ = @t N @ = 4 (1+ ) (1+ ) 2 ( max ) ; which is increasing in for < max .
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) Di¤erentiation of (4) and (6) yields 0 ( ) = 2 h 2 (2 ) 2 2 4 2 4 (3 + 4 ) + 2 i (2 ) 2 (( + 1) (2 ) + 4 ) 2
The sign of this expression is determined by the sign of the bracketed expression in the numerator, which will be increasing in because 2(2 ) [2( 1) ( + 1) ] > 0 for < max : The bracketed expression will equal 0 at = 2+ +4
Since t N ( )=t N ( ) is continuous and increasing in by Lemma 1,t N ( 0 )=t N ( 0 ) < k < t N ( )=t N ( ) and there will exist some 1 2 ( 0 ; ) such that k = t N ( )=t N ( ). We then have dt N ( ) = t N ( ) kt N ( ) d > (<) 0 for < (>) 1 .
Proof of Proposition 1. De…ne J(t) = E( j B (t)) ; if t 2 [t N ( ); t N ( )]:
(A.1)
The necessary condition for optimal choice of binding, (11), will be satis…ed if either J(t) = 0 or t B = t N ( ): If the solution to (11) also satis…es (1 F ( B (t))J 0 (t) f ( B (t))J(t) @ B @t < 0, then it will be a local maximum. Since J(t N ( )) = ( max ) (1+ ) < 0 for < max ;the solution with t B = t N ( ) will be a local minimum for < max . A solution with J(t) = 0 will be a local maximum if J 0 (t) < 0. These observations, combined with the following Lemma (5), establish Proposition 1.
Lemma 5 J(t) is a continuous on [0; t N ( )], with J(0) > 0 and J(t N ( )) < 0 for < max : a) If < 1, then J 0 (t) < 0 and there exists a unique t B 2 (0; t N ( )) that maximizes expected welfare. If ~ Proof. From (A.1), J(t) is continuous in t with J 0 (t) = 2 (1+t) 2 for t < t N ( ) and J 0 (t) = 2( 1) (1+t) 2 (1+ ) for t > t N ( ): (a) Since J(0) = E( ) > 0 and J(t N ( )) < 0 as established above, there will exist a unique t B such that J(t B ) = 0 if < 1. This solution will be a global maximum since J 0 (t B ) < 0. A corner binding with no overhang will exist if t B = E( ) 2 E( ) t N ( ; ), which is shown to hold for ~ using (4). For <~ ; the optimal binding is obtained by solving J 0 (t B ) = 0:
(b) If > 1, J 0 (t) > 0 for t 2 (t N ( ); t N ( )) and there cannot exist a local maximum on this interval. This yields two possibilities: a corner solution with no overhang or a corner solution with an unbound tari¤ (i.e. t B t N ( )). Since~ < 1 when < max , > 1 implies >~ and there will exist a local maximum with no overhang, t B 2 (0; t N ( )), by the arguments in (a). To show that there cannot be an optimum at a corner solution with an unbound tari¤, we show that EW [t B ] is decreasing on (t N ( ); t N ( )). Since sign EW 0 [t B ] =sign J(t), it is su¢ cient to show that J(t) < 0 on that interval. We have established that J(t) is continuous with J(t N ( )) < 0, J(t N ( )) < 0; and J 0 (t) > 0 for t 2 (t N ( ); t N ( )): Therefore we must have J(t) < 0 on the interval.
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that the …rst-order condition for optimal tari¤ binding is given by 2t
The left-hand side of this condition is una¤ected by changes in and . Therefore, it is su¢ cient to show that as a result of this perturbation in and , B t B increases. Now note that since ( ) = t N ( ) t E ( ), and t E ( ) is independent of and ;
an increase in and reduction in that keeps R B t N ( )f ( )d constant will also keep R , where H(t) J(t). H(t) will be continuous on [0; t pro ], with H(0) > 0 and H(t pro ) J(t pro ) < 0. Therefore, there will exist a solution t B 2 (0; t pro ) satisfying H(t B ) = 0: Lemma (5) established that for < max , there will be a unique value t B satisfying J(t B ) = 0. In addition, J(t B ) < 0 for t > t B , which ensures that t B t B . The inequality will be strict if M (t B ) < .
Proof of Lemma 4. In the case of a uniform distribution, we have
At an interior solution, @ B @t B = 2(1+ ) (1+t B ) 2 and the second-order condition for a maximum simpli…es to 1 (1 + t B ) 2 > 1 2 @ M (t B ; c) @t :
(20)
